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entitled "Marijuana and the Law in Maryland." It featured interviews with Judge
Carl Bacharach, a state district court
judge in Baltimore, and Joseph Gallen,
Baltimore County's chief of police, as well
as a "point-counterproint" segment
which pitted state Senator Clarence
Mitchell, an advocate of marijuana
decriminalization, against state Delegate
Steven Sklar, a foe of decriminalization.

Also recelvmg an award was The
Forum, a university-funded and studentedited magazine which publishes articles
of interest to the Maryland legal community. The magazine, in competition
with law school publications nationwide,
won an "Honorable Mention" for its articles on substantive law.

University of Baltimore
School of Law
Honor Court Decision
HONOR COURT DECISIONS
No. 76-1E, September 2, 1976
No. 76-2E, September 22, 1976
FENZEL, J.-Two cases were argued
before Justices Murphy, Fenzel and Smith
of the Evening Division Honor Court.
Since the combined actions of the defendants resulted in similar charges being
placed, alleging misconduct under the
same section of the Honor Code, the
Court decided to consolidate its opinion
to cover both trials.
Students A and B were both charged
with violating sec. 3.03 of the Honor
Code (Code) which states that "it shall be
a violation of the honor code to engage in
any dishonorable conduct which tends to
gain an unfair advantage for any student
in any academic matter."

The court unanimously found A guilt of
violating sec. 3.03 of the Code. Sentence
was imposed under S.OUe) of the Code
which was a reprimand not of record. B,
however, was found not guilty of any
violation.
FACTS
The Open Exam system which is presently in effect at the University of
Baltimore is designed so that a student
may take any exam for which he or she is
scheduled at any of the pre-arranged
times during a two-week period. In obtaining an exam, the student presents his
or her student J.D. and tells the person
distributing the exams the one he or she
wishes to take at that time. In the situation presently before the Court, the defendant A inadvertantly received two copies

of a Commercial Transactions I exam
when he appeared to take the final. After
completing the exam, A returned only one
copy and kept the other. A retained the
exam, for the admitted purpose of filing
with the Student Bar Association, even
though he knew at the time of appropriating the exam the Professor did not allow
his prior exams to be made available to
students as study aids.
Defendant A had no apparent need for
the exam but admitted that it may be
beneficial to other students in the future
who would be preparing for this Professor's final exam in Commercial Transactions I.
As misfortune may have it, a number of
students for that semester received a
"provisional" failure (F) in this course.
The "F" grade was subject to change if
the unsuccessful student took another
exam anytime during the summer, at a
time convenient to the Professor, and succeeded in passing the course.
A received a passing grade on the initial
exam and consequently did not take the
re-examination. However, defendant B in
receiving a "provisional" failure, of which
he had casually informed A, had decided
to take the re-examination during the
summer. Shortly after the end of the
Spring Semester and upon learning that B
was taking the re-examination, A informed B that he had a copy of the most
recent Commercial Transactions I exam,
and he would mail it to B to use as a study
gUide. B received the exam in the mail,
and later returned it to A upon A's request. A contacted B prior to B's taking
the exam upon learning that his acts constituted a possible Honor Code violation.
A testified before this Court that a fellow
student had informed A that she felt
obligated under the Code to contact a
member of the Student Bar Association as
the whereabouts of the exam and A's purported acts. The exam eventually was sent
to the Special Prosecutor's Office and the
resulting charges were placed.
The indictment filed by the Special
Prosecutor simply charged both A and B
with the respective acts of distributing
and receiving the Commercial Transactions I exam which constituted dishonorable conduct tending to give B an unfair
advantage. A and B were specifically
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charged with violating section sec. 3.03 of
the Evening Division Honor Code.
ISSUES
The main issue to be decided is whether
the conduct of the defendants did in fact
give an unfair advantage to any student.
The prosecution's main contentions
were that the acts of A constituted dishonorable conduct because: (1) A, knowing that the Professor of the particular
Commercial Transactions I Course did not
allow for the dissemination of previous
exams to any students, voluntarily gave
the exam to B, (2) A knew that B was to
take a re-examination of Commercial
Transactions I-covering the exact same
subject matter as the copy which he had
retained, and (3) B was to be the only student, to A's knowledge, who would be
able to use the prior exam in preparing for
the re-examination.
In a transcribed deposition admitted
into evidence by the Court without objection to any answer by defendant A, the
prosecution showed by A's admissions,
and corroborated by the prosecution's
witness, that A did realize that his actions
would benefit B only and that the Professor did not allow the use of prior exams as
study aids. Since the prosecution had met
its burden of proof (Le. beyond a reasonable doubt) a motion for acquittal by the
defendant A was denied.
The defendant A, per se, contended
that the conduct in question was not dishonorable because he had no specific intent to allow another student to gain an
unfair advantage and that no unfair advantage was gained by.B since the re-examination did not ask the same specific
questions as the exam mailed to B.
The Court concludes, at the close of the
defendant's case and upon hearing final
arguments by both sides, that the speCific
act of A, giving B the copy of the Commercial Transactions I exam, constituted
dishonorable conduct. Intent is not an element of this section of the Code. The section was designed to encompass a great
diversity as to the kinds of activities
regulated by the Code. If intent were a req'lisite element, then obViously this section would be restrictive rather than broad
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as the drafters of the Code obViously intended.l
The fact that B was to be the only student who could avail himself to this prior
exam, also considering the absolute policy
of the Professor as to the censorhsip of his
previous exams for study aids, and, as adduced from questioning the Professor
before this Court, the fact that historically
he had used questions or factual situations
on previous exams more than once, we
conclude that A did violate sec. 3.03 of
the Honor Code.
Considering the nature of the offense,
evidence of good character of the student
and the ultimate advantage which
resulted, the student was reprimanded
and the contents of the Court file were not
to be made a part of A's permanent
record.
The Dean of the Law School was to
receive a letter as to the findings of the
Honor Court.
The prosecution in arguing the case of
B likewise contended, inter alia, that the
receipt of the examination from A was
dishonorable conduct. Even though B
testified on his own behalf that he was not
aware of the Professor's policy as to the
1

Comments to sec. 3.03 states that "the section was
written in recognition that all the conceivable ways
in which one student can gain unfair advantage over
another cannot be enumerated with detailed
specificity. Therefore, the section is a grant of power
to the Honor Court to made an hoc determinations
as to the unfairness of any given student's conduct."

availability of his previous exams, the
standard which should be used to gauge
the actions of defendants under sec. 3.03,
according to the prosecution, is to be an
objective reasonable man standard.
Therefore, the prosecution claims that B
should have known of the Professor's
policy, and notwithstanding his ignorance
of the policy, the conduct was dishonorable.
The defendant B, with effective assistance of counsel, moved for acquittal
before the introduction of any evidence
on the grounds that sec. 4.02(b)(I), which
required written notice to the defendant
prior to the preliminary hearing of the
specific charges and course of conduct of
which the defendant is accused, had not
been strictly followed. The Prosecutor admitted failure to comply with this section.
In denying the motion the Court felt
that the failure to comply with sec.
4.02(b)(I) was not prejudicial to the defendant and is not crucial to the disposition of this case. The Court in denying the
motion on these grounds did not consider
the timeliness of the defendant's objection.
The defendant B admitted that he did
receive the exam, but that receipt of such
did not constitute dishonorable conduct
since he did not have knowledge of the
Professor's policy. The defendant also
argued that the prosecution did not meet
its burden of proof requirement, Le.
beyond a reasonable doubt. Additionally,

NOTICE:
Law Placement
Do you need a part-time law clerk, a summer law
clerk or a full-time law graduate? Or, do you have
a law related position that you would like to have
competently filled?
Contact Assistant Dean William I. Weston
at the Law Placement Service at the University of Baltimore
001

of. Law, 1420 North Charles Street, Baltimore, Md. 21202.

by returning the exam which he received
. from A well before taking the re-examination, B attempted to show good faith and
lack of intent to gain an unfair advantage.
Without deciding all the issues presented to the Court by the prosecution

and defense, the Court holds that the
prosecution did not successfully meet its
burden of proving beyond a reasonable
doubt that B's conduct was dishonorable.
Any presumption of dishonorable conduct
was erased by B's unassailed testimony

that he did not know of the Professor's
restrictive policy as to availability of previous exams at the time of receiving the
copy from A.
In conclusion, B was found not guilty of
violating sec. 3.03 of the Code.

Supreme· Court
Decisions

Lawyer

Advertising
Given
Go-Ahead
by Glenn A. Jacobson

Be it bane or godsend to the legal profession, the Supreme Court has given the
green light to the formerly blasphemous
practice of lawyers advertising their services. Self-regulation by member-run professional organizations was the traditional
means of guaranteeing the public that
they would receive good value for their
money and quality work when they retained a lawyer. But, the exclusive
watchdog function of these organizations
has now been eroded by the wave of consumerism. The most recent example of

this trend is the case of Bates v. State Bar
of Arizona, 97 S.Ct. 2691 (1977).
In 1974, John R. Bates and Van
a'Steen, having been members of the
Arizona Bar for two years, opened a law
practice in Phoenix, Arizona which they
referred to as a "legal clinic." A major
goal of this practice was "to provide legal
services at modest fees to persons of
moderate income who did not qualify for
governmental legal aid." 97 S.Ct. at
2694.
The clinic accepted only routine matters such as uncontested separations and
divorces, personal bankruptcies, name
changes, and uncontested adoptions,
making extensive use of paralegal assistants and standardized forms to facilitate a
quick flow of business.
Two years later, "appellants concluded
that their practice and clinical concept
could not survive unless the availability of
legal services at low cost was advertised
and, in particular, fees were advertised."
97 S.Ct. at 2694. an February 22, 1976,
Bates and a'Steen placed their advertisement in the Arizona Republic, a Phoenix
daily newspaper, offering "legal services
at very reasonable fees" and listing particular services and corresponding fees.
In response, the President of the
Arizona State Bar initiated proceedings
against Bates and a'Steen, alleging that
their advertisement was in violation of
Rule 29(a) of the Supreme Court of
Arizona, 17 Arizona Stat. (1976 Supp.),
p. 26. The disciplinary rule provides in
part:
"(B) A lawyer shall not publicize himself, or his partner, or associate, or any

other lawyer through newspaper .,.
advertisements .... "
A three member Special Local Administrative Committee held a hearing, pursuant to Arizona Supreme Court Rule 33,
but declined to consider an attack on the
valildity of the rule. However, the committee did recommend that both Bates
and a'Steen be suspended from the practice of law for at least six months. Shortly
thereafter, the Board of Governors of the
Arizona State Bar, pursuant to Supreme
Court Rule 36, reviewed the case and
recommended one week suspensions to
each appellant.
Bates and a'Steen sought review of the
case in the Arizona Supreme Court alleging that the disciplinary rule they had ignored was both violative of the Sherman
Anti-Trust Act and an infringement of
their First Amendment rights. The
Arizona Supreme Court rejected both
claims, and the Supreme Court of the
United States consented to hear the case.
429 U.S. 813 (1976).
The Supreme Court's decision in the
Bates case focused on an analysis of the
allegation that First Amendment Rights
were being interfered with by the continued enforcement of Arizona Supreme
Court Rule 20. This analysis is an extension of previous Supreme Court decisions
acknowledging First Amendment protection for commercial speech. Bigelow v.
Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975); Virginia
State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia
Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S.
748 (1976).
In Bigelow, the managing editor of a
Virginia newspaper was found guilty of
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